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Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy
for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion:
A Descriptive and Normative Analysis
Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine
I. INTRODUCTION
Although courts have traditionally relied primarily on prosecutors’ individual
self-restraint and institutional self-regulation to curb prosecutors’ excesses and
redress their wrongdoing, 1 aspects of prosecutors’ conduct can be regulated
externally as well. One potential source of external regulation is professional
discipline. As lawyers, prosecutors are regulated by state courts, which oversee
processes for disciplining lawyers who engage in misconduct.2 In responding to
prosecutors’ wrongdoing, courts generally express a preference for professional
discipline over civil liability, which is limited by principles of absolute and
qualified immunity. 3 Likewise, courts favor professional discipline over
adjudicatory remedies such as reversal of criminal convictions or suppression of
evidence, which are often unavailable because of the harmless error doctrine and
other limitations.4
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See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)
(“Much of what the United States Attorney’s office does isn’t open to public scrutiny or judicial
review. It is therefore particularly important that the government discharge its responsibilities fairly,
consistent with due process. The overwhelming majority of prosecutors are decent, ethical, honorable
lawyers who understand the awesome power they wield, and the responsibility that goes with it.”).
See generally Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940).
2
See, e.g., Bruce Green & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Rehabilitating Lawyers: Perceptions of
Deviance and Its Cures in the Lawyer Reinstatement Process, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139 (2012);
Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
3
See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (rejecting municipal liability for Brady
violations); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding prosecutors performing
investigative functions are entitled to qualified immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429
(1976) (rejecting civil rights claim against prosecutor and explaining that “a prosecutor stands
perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his
amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers”).
4
See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988) (rejecting
dismissal of indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury proceeding in case of
harmless error, finding that “the court may direct a prosecutor to show cause why he should not be
1

143

144

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 14:143

For many years, however, the conventional wisdom has been that disciplinary
authorities do not effectively regulate prosecutors.5 Studies have concluded that
prosecutors are rarely disciplined, even when a judge presiding over a criminal
case finds that the prosecutor acted improperly. 6 Further, many observers have
asserted that in the rare cases of discipline, courts typically let prosecutors off too
lightly. 7 Disciplinary authorities’ deferential treatment of prosecutors, though
perhaps subject to explanation,8 remains, in the view of many commentators, also
disciplined and request the bar or the Department of Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against him”); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983) (citation omitted)
(rejecting reversal of conviction in case of harmless error, suggesting instead that “the court could
have dealt with the offending argument by directing the District Court to order the prosecutor to show
cause why he should not be disciplined, or by asking the Department of Justice to initiate a
disciplinary proceeding against him”); United States v. McRae, 795 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2015); In
re Larsen, No. 20140535, 2016 WL 3369545, at *6 (Utah June 16, 2016) (upholding discipline
regardless of the absence of a Brady violation) (“The question under Brady is a matter of due process
. . . . But rule 3.8(d)’s focus is different. It is aimed not only at assuring a fair trial—by articulating a
standard for a motion for a new one—but also at establishing an ethical duty that will avoid the
problem in the first place.”). But see, e.g., United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 355 (5th Cir. 2015)
(affirming reversal due to “[t]he district court’s steady drip of discoveries of misconduct infecting
every stage of this prosecution, combined with the government’s continued obfuscation and deceit”);
United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding for district court to
consider dismissing the indictment with prejudice as a sanction for prosecutorial misconduct); People
v. Velasco-Palacios, 235 Cal. App. 4th 439 (2015) (affirming dismissal of indictment as sanction for
prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence during plea negotiations).
5
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Preface, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
iii, xl (2015) (describing “futility of getting bar disciplinary boards to impose
professional discipline for misconduct committed in the course of criminal prosecutions”).
6
See, e.g., Matt Ferner, Prosecutors Are Almost Never Disciplined for Misconduct,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/prosecutor-misconductjustice_us_56bce00fe4b0c3c55050748a; Kozinski, supra note 5, at xl (asserting that “[t]here have
been a few instances of professional discipline against prosecutors, though . . . much less than against
similarly-situated private lawyers” and that “professional organizations are exceedingly reluctant to
impose sanctions on prosecutors for misconduct in carrying out their professional responsibilities”);
see also Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping the
Contours of Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 81 (2012) (citing “the small number of
sanctions against prosecutors, relative to lawyers as a whole”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 725 (2001) (describing the “rarity of discipline” of
prosecutors).
7
See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108, 120 (Okla. 2013)
(finding “[i]nstances of prosecutorial misconduct from previous decades . . . were often met with
nothing more than a reprimand or a short suspension”); id. at n.40 (citing sources); cf. MacLean &
Wilks, supra note 6, at 62 (finding that in “extreme cases of unethical prosecutorial behavior . . .
states’ attorney discipline systems act swiftly and harshly,” but that “[o]n the lower end of unethical
prosecutorial behavior, the penalties appear to be somewhat rare and usually minimal when the line
between unethical behavior and mere prosecutorial error is blurred”).
8
See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 6, at 725 (finding that “[m]any of the rules of professional
conduct . . . are . . . altogether inapplicable, or barely applicable, to full-time prosecutors” and “[t]his,
combined with the special characteristics of prosecutors and the activities they engage in, helps
explain the rarity of discipline”).
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subject to criticism, if not altogether unjustifiable. Accordingly, critics urge
disciplinary agencies to pursue prosecutors more aggressively, especially for forms
of recurring wrongdoing such as improper closing arguments or withholding of
exculpatory evidence.9
A handful of recent high-profile disciplinary cases, beginning with Mike
Nifong’s disbarment in 2007, give the impression that disciplinary agencies are
getting more serious about responding to prosecutorial misconduct, and the public
continues to pressure them to do so. But many legal scholars assume that even if
professional discipline grows more robust with regard to certain areas of
prosecutorial conduct, professional discipline can never be effective with regard to
one broad, significant, and notably problematic area of prosecutorial conduct: the
abusive exercise of prosecutorial discretion, especially with regard to charging and
plea bargaining.10 U.S. Supreme Court decisions and other case law establish that
federal judges presiding over criminal cases are generally required, for reasons
relating to constitutional separation of powers, to defer to prosecutors’ decisions
about whether to initiate or dismiss criminal charges.11 Commentators suggest that
similar concerns prevent state courts from implementing meaningful regulation of
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions through the disciplinary process.12

9
See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (2007); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to
Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC L. REV. 275 (2004).
10
See, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR,
143–61 (2007); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 669, 678–82 (1992); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1525 (1981) (“[T]here are good reasons to see prosecutors’ virtually unlimited control
over charging as inconsistent with a system of criminal procedure fair to defendants and to the
public.”).
11
See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
12
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010):
[E]ven if they possess the necessary staffing and funds to engage in a proper inquiry into
misconduct, state bars, which are typically arms of the judiciary, may be reluctant to dig
too deeply into the operation of the prosecutor’s office out of concern that they will
interfere with the workings of another part of government.
Id. at 2096; Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 977–78 (2009) (“Separation-of-powers concerns can also make bar authorities
hesitate to intrude upon prosecutors’ province.”); Zacharias, supra note 6:
[A]uthorities may sense a real separation of powers issue. Ultimately, bar authorities in
most jurisdictions operate under the rubric of the courts. Prosecutors are members of the
executive branch. To the extent discipline requires an investigation of the workings of a
prosecutor’s office, disciplinary agencies may consider it invasive of the authority of a
coordinate branch of government. On occasion, prosecutors have directly raised the
claim that the application of particular professional rules to them violates the principle of
separation of powers.
Id. at 761.
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Responding to these concerns, this Article explores the role of professional
discipline in regulating prosecutors’ work, focusing on disciplinary regulation of
prosecutors’ charging decisions, which are typically thought to be discretionary
and therefore off-limits to judicial review. The subject is important. Prosecutors’
discretionary decisions regarding whether to commence and continue a prosecution
often determine the outcome of a criminal case.13 For many years, courts, scholars,
bar associations, law reform organizations, and others have expressed concern
about prosecutors’ abuse of this extraordinary power, documenting practices that
appear to reflect political favoritism, 14 personal self-interest, 15 undercharging, 16
overcharging,17 arbitrariness,18 or bias,19 among other possible deficiencies.20
Significantly, there is no consensus regarding how best to regulate
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion. Although some have favored legislative

13

See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408 (2001) (“The charging decision is arguably the most important
prosecutorial power and the strongest example of the influence and reach of prosecutorial
discretion.”); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197 (2016).
14
See, e.g., Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L.
REV. 953 (2010); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
837, 847–48; Note, Prosecutor’s Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955).
15
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464, 2470–73 (2004) (describing ways prosecutors’ “pressures and incentives” affect plea
bargain decisions); Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of
Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 56 (2007) (“Scholars roundly critique prosecutors for pursuing
self-interest and favorable statistics at the expense of the public interest.”).
16
See, e.g., Tom Lininger, An Ethical Duty to Charge Batterers Appropriately, 22 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 173 (2015) (analyzing undercharging in domestic violence cases); Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002); David
Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for Real-Offense Sentencing, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 1434, 1435 (1997).
17
See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701 (2014); Tracey L.
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); Mitchell Stephens, Ignoring Justice:
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Ethics of Charging, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 53 (2008).
18
See generally, DAVIS, supra note 10.
19
See, e.g., Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion—Knowing There Will Be
Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing
Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 463 (2009); Anne Bowen Poulin,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v.
Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1081–82, 1085 (1997).
20
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 973 (referencing “systemic concerns about equality,
arbitrariness, leniency, and overcharging”). See also Prosecutorial Oversight: A National Dialogue
in the Wake of Connick v. Thompson, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 29, 2016),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/prosecutorial-oversight-national-dialogue-wake-connick-vthompson/; Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2764399.
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oversight, 21 others view legislation as a “pipe dream,” particularly given the
political pressure on legislators to appear tough on crime. 22 Some urge more
effective internal self-regulation, 23 but one might be skeptical of whether
prosecutors can be persuaded to effectively rein in their own power.24 Still others
urge that the courts or legislation should authorize expanded judicial review of
prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining decisions, 25 but others view these
alternatives as unrealistic, particularly in light of federal concerns over separation
of powers.26
Against this background, the possibility that judicial oversight through
professional discipline may play a meaningful future role in regulating
prosecutors’ discretionary decision making—notwithstanding the past
ineffectiveness of discipline in regulating almost any aspect of prosecutors’
work—deserves consideration. To be sure, expanded exercise of disciplinary
authority leaves a number of issues unresolved, as discipline is traditionally limited
to addressing misconduct, rather than responding to less substantial errors in
judgment. Moreover, on a broader level, any attempt to determine the optimal
strategy to rein in prosecutorial abuse of discretion would involve a range of
additional factors, including an examination of various ways discretion is used.27
Nevertheless, given the current under-regulation of prosecutorial decision making,

21

See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1566–68. See also DAVIS, supra note 10, at 180–89;
Davis, supra note 13, at 462–63; Poulin, supra note 19, at 1119–22.
22
Bibas, supra note 12, at 966. See also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 911 (2009) (“The
political process overwhelmingly favors prosecutors. Any oversight by Congress would serve largely
to make sure that prosecutors are being sufficiently tough. . . . [I]t is hard to imagine a scenario where
Congress would put in place an oversight scheme that would offer greater protection for
defendants.”).
23
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 22; Bibas, supra note 12; Poulin, supra note 19, at 1122–24.
24
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 22, at 917 (acknowledging difficulty in trying to “prompt
prosecutors to change the view they have of themselves”).
25
See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983).
26
At least on the federal level, the question of whether courts could review charging decisions
more strictly, either pursuant to legislative authorization or as a matter of inherent judicial authority,
raises complicated questions of constitutional separation of powers. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988) (upholding statutory provisions of independent counsel law against arguments of judicial
encroachment on prosecutor’s executive function); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)
(upholding presumption that agency decisions not to institute proceedings are not subject to judicial
review). See generally William F. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United
States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
1325 (1993). This article does not delve into these complex questions, though it emphasizes that,
regardless of the federal view on separation-of-powers, state courts interpreting state constitutions
can conceivably resolve these issues differently. See infra Part IV.
27
See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible
Exit Strategies, 109 PA. ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005).
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this article seeks to demonstrate the potential value of increased disciplinary
authority. In addition, discipline might serve a useful, interstitial function, as
perhaps future laws will otherwise provide more meaningful restraints on
prosecutors’ power.
Part II of this Article discusses areas of misconduct for which prosecutors
may be disciplined. It argues that, although few ethics rules specifically target
prosecutors’ work, a number of generally applicable rules potentially address much
of what courts regard as prosecutorial misconduct. In particular, courts have a
degree of latitude to interpret the current rules to regulate abuses of prosecutorial
discretion.
Part III offers a largely descriptive analysis of how ethics rules have been
enforced to date in cases involving prosecutors’ professional work. It argues that
although ethics rules may remain largely under-enforced as applied to prosecutors,
the Nifong case may mark a potential turning point, as some disciplinary
authorities now appear to be responding more forcefully to prosecutorial
misconduct. Moreover, several disciplinary cases have been brought against highranking elected prosecutors, driven substantially by concerns about abuses of
charging power.
Finally, Part IV considers the potential future role of professional discipline in
responding to prosecutors’ abuse of charging discretion.
It focuses on
commentators’ assumption that discipline is an unpromising route to redressing
abuses of discretion because state courts in the disciplinary context, like federal
courts in the adjudicatory context, must generally defer to prosecutors’
discretionary decision making. We argue that federal separations of powers
principles, which account for federal courts’ deference in adjudicating cases, are
not universally applicable to state courts. Indeed, state courts often exercise the
authority to inquire into various aspects of prosecutors’ decision making, in both
adjudicating criminal cases and sanctioning prosecutors who violate the
constitution, statutes, or ethics rules.
The harder question is whether courts can regulate prosecutors’ discretionary
decision making in a manner similar to the regulation of prosecutors’ work as trial
lawyers. That is, may state courts, through rule making or interpretation, adopt
independent ethical standards to govern prosecutors’ exercise of charging
discretion and sanction prosecutors for abuses of discretion that contravene the
applicable rules? We show that at least some state courts exercise this authority as
well, and in so doing, the courts appear to rely on firm doctrinal and policy
grounds. The Article does not explore whether an expansive interpretation of state
courts’ disciplinary authority is ultimately justified under the various state
constitutions. However, the Article concludes that, to the extent courts exercise an
increasingly robust form of professional discipline of prosecutors, one can expect
to see more cases targeting not only discrete law-breaking but also more general
prosecutorial abuses of power, including in areas often thought to be within the
broad discretion of prosecutorial decision making.
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II. ETHICS RULES REGULATING PROSECUTORS’ WORK
State courts adopt codes of ethics, consisting of rules of professional conduct
that regulate the work of lawyers licensed to practice law in the state or appearing
in the state’s courts pro hac vice. 28 States’ ethics rules are based largely, in
substance and typically in form, on the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.29 Lawyers, including prosecutors, are subject to professional discipline,
such as a private or public reprimand, suspension, or disbarment, for violating
ethics rules.30 In most states, discipline is a quasi-criminal process overseen by the
state judiciary. In many states, staff lawyers or volunteer lawyers investigate,
initiate and prosecute disciplinary cases, which are heard by lawyers or judges,
subject to judicial review.31 A court presiding over a criminal case might conclude
that particular prosecutorial conduct is wrongful, and in some instances, a
prosecutor might be held up to judicial or public opprobrium for improper conduct,
but the prosecutor cannot be professionally disciplined unless the conduct violates
an ethics rule. Consequently, the potential effectiveness of discipline as a
regulatory mechanism depends in the first instance on the reach of the ethics rules.
Although courts and commentators sometimes proclaim that prosecutors have
different and higher ethical obligations than other lawyers, 32 this principle is
largely absent from the ethics rules.33 In general, prosecutors are subject, at most,

28

See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of
Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2009).
29
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
30
See supra note 2.
31
See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108, 113–14 (Okla. 2013)
(explaining that Oklahoma court makes factual determinations and determines the sanction with
assistance from representatives of the private bar who hear evidence and make recommendations).
32
For the classic judicial articulation of this principle, see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done.”). See also, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 at
1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (“Prosecutors are subject to constraints and responsibilities
that don’t apply to other lawyers. While lawyers representing private parties may—indeed, must—do
everything ethically permissible to advance their clients’ interests, lawyers representing the
government in criminal cases serve truth and justice first.”); Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Samuel J. Levine, Taking
Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to “Seek
Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337 (2004).
33
The ABA has relegated this idea to the comments to the rules. See MODEL RULES r. 3.8,
cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”).
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to the same rules as all other lawyers.34 The rules most relevant to prosecutors are
those governing advocacy35 and dealings with adversarial parties and witnesses.36
For example, advocates may not knowingly make false statements to the court or
knowingly offer or rely on false testimony.37 They are limited in making public
communications while adjudicative proceedings are pending.38 In jury arguments,
they may not assert personal knowledge of the facts or make factual assertions that
find no support in the evidence. 39 On their face, advocacy rules such as these
apply no more to prosecutors than to other trial lawyers. Moreover, it has been
observed that the substance of most other ethics rules has little or no relevance to
the work of prosecutors.40 Rules regulating the lawyer-client relationship are far
less applicable to prosecutors than to lawyers representing private clients, and rules
regulating a lawyer’s legal fees and marketing efforts are entirely irrelevant to
prosecutors.41
To be sure, courts have the authority to interpret ethics rules more creatively
than statutes42 and to apply these rules differently in the context of prosecutors’
work, consistent with prosecutors’ unique duty to serve justice.43 Indeed, in some
respects, courts have interpreted generally applicable ethics rules differently—
sometimes more restrictively, and sometimes less so—in addressing prosecutors’
conduct.44 For example, courts expect greater candor from prosecutors than from

34

Most of the Model Rules are rules of general applicability. The ABA has not responded to
suggestions that it craft specialized ethics rules for different areas of law practice. See, e.g., Nancy B.
Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for
the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing
Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169 (1997). The special rule for prosecutors is the most
prominent exception. See infra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
35
See MODEL RULES r. 3.3, 3.4 & 3.6.
36
See id., r. 4.2 & 4.3.
37
Id., r. 3.3.
38
Id., r. 3.6.
39
Id., r. 3.4.
40
Zacharias, supra note 6, at 725–42.
41
Id. at 726–28.
42
See Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules,
55 BROOK L. REV. 485 (1989); Samuel J. Levine, The Law and the “Spirit of the Law” in Legal
Ethics, 2015 J. PROF. LAW. 1 (2015); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics
Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77
TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003) [hereinafter Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously].
43
See Green, supra note 32; Levine, supra note 32. But see Samuel J. Levine, Judicial
Rhetoric and Lawyers’ Roles, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1989 (2015) (cautioning against applying
ethics rules in a way that prevents effective prosecution of deserving criminals).
44
See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal
Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000).
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other lawyers, 45 but they give prosecutors more latitude than other lawyers to
reward witnesses for testifying.46
By and large, however, courts have refrained from interpreting ethics rules in
a way that would demand more from prosecutors than from lawyers for private
parties. For example, ethics rules subject a lawyer to sanction for offering false
evidence only if the lawyer knows the evidence is false.47 While the ABA’s nonenforceable guidelines for prosecutors propose a higher standard, exhorting
prosecutors to offer evidence only if they reasonably believe it to be true,48 courts
have not interpreted ethics rules to align with this stricter normative expectation for
prosecutors. In short, the fact that comparatively few ethics rules apply to
prosecutors’ work, coupled with courts’ general reluctance to interpret the
applicable rules expansively in the context of prosecutorial ethics, may help
explain why, as a descriptive matter, proportionately fewer prosecutors are
publicly disciplined when compared with private practitioners.49
The ABA has promulgated one ethics rule that is directed exclusively at
prosecutors, Model Rule 3.8. Most notably, Rule 3.8(d), which addresses
prosecutors’ disclosure obligations, has been found by the ABA to demand more
extensive and earlier disclosure than required under constitutional case law,50 and
some courts have agreed.51 Moreover, the most recent additions, Rule 3.8(g) and
(h), address prosecutors’ post-conviction obligations,52 giving substance to the duty
to rectify wrongful convictions.53 Most prosecutors accept the basic premise of
these new provisions, though some have raised objections to the wording of the
provisions or to the concept that prosecutors’ post-conviction decisions, such as

45
See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 75 & nn.34–36 (1995).
46
See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
a prosecutor’s provision of leniency in exchange for testimony does not violate federal criminal law
prohibiting compensating witnesses); see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 44, at 221 & n.89
(citing cases rejecting argument that inducements to testify in plea bargaining might violate a federal
bribery statute).
47
MODEL RULES r. 3.3.
48
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.4(b) (4th ed.
2015).
49
Zacharias, supra note 6, at 743–65.
50
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (July 8, 2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2015/May/Conferen
ce/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.authcheckdam.pdf.
51
See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethical Duty of Disclosure in Memory of Fred
Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 57 (2011).
52
See MODEL RULES r. 3.8(g)–(h).
53
See, e.g., Warney v. Monroe Cty., 587 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2009).
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whether and how to investigate closed cases, should be subject to disciplinary
oversight.54
On the whole, however, Rule 3.8 addresses relatively few aspects of
prosecutors’ work. 55 Even Rule 3.8(a), the only provision that regulates
prosecutors’ charging decisions, 56 is essentially limited to restating the
constitutional minimum, 57 merely prohibiting prosecutors from pursuing charges
that are not supported by probable cause. Many commentators contend that, in
their gate-keeping capacity, prosecutors should employ a more demanding
standard, and many prosecutors agree.58 However, the language of Rule 3.8(a) not
only leaves to prosecutors the apparently unfettered discretion to decline to bring
charges or to seek to dismiss charges, for any reason at all—no matter how
ostensibly arbitrary or biased—but also allows prosecutors to bring charges, no
matter how unjust or unjustified, as long as the low probable-cause standard is
satisfied.
A few state judiciaries have revised or supplemented Rule 3.8(a) to further
regulate prosecutors’ charging decisions. In Washington D.C., Rule 3.8 provides
that a prosecutor shall not “[i]n exercising discretion to investigate or to prosecute,
improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any person,”59 or “[p]rosecute
to trial a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence sufficient
to establish a prima facie showing of guilt.”60 A recently enacted Massachusetts
rule restricts prosecutors’ plea bargaining discretion, requiring a prosecutor to
“refrain from seeking, as a condition of a disposition agreement in a criminal
matter, the defendant’s waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or
prosecutorial misconduct.” 61 These provisions might be viewed as modest
additions to the respective state ethics codes and, even at that, they are exceptional.

54

See, e.g., sources cited in Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873 (2012); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion
and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009).
55
See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573;
Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 427 (2009); Levine, supra note 32.
56
MODEL RULES r. 3.8(a) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”).
57
See, e.g., Green, supra note 55, at 1588–89.
58
See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the
Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513 (1993); Green, supra note 55, at 1589 nn.78–81
(citing sources).
59
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a).
60
Id. r. 3.8(c).
61
MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(h) (Mass. Court System 2016). The new rule also
includes a provision regulating prosecutors’ pretrial exercise of investigative discretion, providing
that a prosecutor “shall . . . not avoid pursuit of evidence because the prosecutor believes it will
damage the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.” Id. r. 3.8(g).
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While ethics rules may initially appear to leave much of prosecutors’ work
unregulated, or to regulate prosecutors too leniently, it would be inaccurate to
conclude, as a normative matter, that when courts condemn a prosecutor’s conduct
as wrongful, ethics rules would rarely apply. Several generally applicable rules,
independently or taken together, can be—and, in some cases, have been—read to
allow disciplinary responses to prosecutorial misconduct. First, outright illegal
conduct, such as prosecutors’ violations of discovery rules or court rules, can often
be sanctioned under ethics rules that incorporate existing legal provisions. 62
Second, a catch-all provision, prohibiting “conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice,” 63 allows for punishment not only for violations of
existing law or rules, but also for other prosecutorial misconduct that violates
judicial expectations, such that the conduct undermines the fairness of criminal
proceedings.64 Third, a provision forbidding “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation” 65 provides a ground to discipline prosecutors for
conduct directed at courts, defense lawyers, defendants, or witnesses that, although
not involving an outright lie, entails deliberate deception. Fourth, ethics rules hold
lawyers, including prosecutors, accountable in some circumstances for misconduct
committed by their subordinates or others with whom they work.66 Finally, the
rule establishing lawyers’ duty to “provide competent representation”67 can be read
to allow courts to punish prosecutors for some forms of wrongdoing, such as
suppression of evidence that, although unintentional or unknowing, is committed
through negligence.68 The competence rule might also be interpreted as a basis for
sanctioning prosecutors for failing to take reasonable measures to ensure the
truthfulness and reliability of their witnesses or for other failures to take reasonable
care to avoid convicting innocent individuals.69
It is unclear how far the existing rules can be extended to reach abuses of
prosecutorial charging discretion in particular. 70 One might infer that charging
decisions are not subject to discipline as long as they satisfy the probable cause
requirement of Rule 3.8(a). However, aggressive or creative disciplinary

62

MODEL RULES r. 3.4(a)–(c).
Id. r. 8.4(d); see Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 42, at 558–61.
64
See, e.g., People v. Chambers, 154 P.3d 419 (Colo. 2006). See also Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics
Op.
KBA
E-435
(Nov.
17,
2012),
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.kybar.org/resource/resmgr/Ethics_Opinions_(Part_2)_/kba_e-435.pdf.
65
MODEL RULES r. 8.4(c).
66
Id. r. 5.1 & 8.4(a). Cf. In re McNally, 901 P.2d 415 (Alaska 1995).
67
MODEL RULES r. 1.1.
68
See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L REV. 1 (2009).
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6, at 75 (observing that “the majority of
prosecutorial decisions are guided by prosecutors’ internal ethical compasses. . . .”).
63
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authorities might address perceived abuses of discretionary authority under at least
three other rules. First, where the abusive charging decision appears to be
improperly motivated by a prosecutor’s desire to advance a third party’s interests
or the prosecutor’s own self-interest, a conflict of interest rule may apply.71 For
example, prosecutors may be subject to discipline under conflict of interest rules
for making charging decisions and otherwise participating in criminal cases where
they have a past or present lawyer-client relationship, financial relationship or
familial relationship with the putative defendant or victim.72 Conflict rules might
also be invoked when prosecutors appear to be advancing less tangible interests,
such as their own political self-interest.73 Second, where the prosecutor has an
impermissible purpose for undertaking a prosecution, disciplinary authorities
might proceed under Rule 4.4(a),74 which forbids a lawyer from using means on
behalf of a client “that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
or burden a third person.” 75 Finally, disciplinary authorities might invoke the
“conduct that is prejudicial to justice” catch-all provision to address certain
perceived abuses of prosecutorial discretion.76 Although the terms of this rule are

71

See MODEL RULES, r. 1.7, 1.9, 1.10 & 1.11.
See, e.g., In re Ruffin, 54 So. 3d 645 (La. 2011) (suspending prosecutor for threatening
criminal charges to help a friend collect on a bounced check); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v.
Rhodes, 453 N.W.2d 73 (Neb. 1990) (suspending prosecutor who cultivated relationship with
defendant by dismissing minor charges and then attempting to coerce a relationship by threatening to
file more serious ones). Many of the disciplinary actions have been against part-time prosecutors for
conflicts between their public responsibilities and their private practices. See, e.g., In re Holste, 358
P.3d 850 (Kan. 2015) (part-time prosecutor suspended for threatening criminal action to gain an
advantage for a civil client); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Ballard, 349 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2011) (disciplining parttime prosecutor for negotiating plea agreement with creditor client’s manager); In re Cole, 738
N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. 2000) (disciplining part-time prosecutor for appearing as a prosecutor in cases
involving private clients); In re Toups, 773 So. 2d 709 (La. 2000) (sanctioning part-time prosecutor
for appearing as prosecutor against spouses of private divorce clients); In re Jones, PR 08-0216, slip
op. at 1–2 (Mont. June 24, 2009); In re Thrush, 448 N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. 1983) (disciplining part-time
prosecutor who failed to recuse himself in criminal case filed against a divorce client); Va. State Bar
v. Gunter, 11 Va. Cir. 349 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1969) (reprimanding part-time prosecutor who filed bigamy
charge against a man while representing the man’s wife in a divorce action). See generally Richard
H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81
KY. L.J. 1 (1992–93).
73
See, e.g., In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, 73–75, 132–35, 137–38,
217–18 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012), http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410Thomas-Aubuchon.PDF; In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bonet, 29 P.3d 1242 (Wash. 2001) (disciplining prosecutor for
offering to dismiss criminal charges against a defendant in exchange for defendant’s agreement not
testify on behalf of co-defendant).
74
MODEL RULES r. 4.4(a).
75
Id.; Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, 64–70, 136–37, 212–13.
76
MODEL RULES r. 8.4(d). See, e.g., Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, 83–87, 218; In re Ruffin, 54
So. 3d 645 (La. 2011) (suspending prosecutor for threatening criminal charges to help a friend collect
on a bounced check); Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 762 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa
72
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arguably somewhat vague, courts have imposed discipline for violations of broad
ethics provisions, on the grounds that lawyers are generally expected to know what
conduct is required of them.77
III. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICS RULES AGAINST PROSECUTORS:
A BRIEF DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
For more than a century, state courts have exercised disciplinary authority in
response to instances of prosecutorial misconduct.78 In so doing, courts have, at
times, expressly rejected both the argument that, as executive branch officials, state
prosecutors should not be subject to judicial regulation,79 and the argument that,
because of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal prosecutors cannot be
regulated under state judicial discipline. 80 That said, there is an overwhelming
consensus of opinion that ethics rules are under-enforced against prosecutors. 81
Although studies show that state disciplinary authorities sometimes bring
proceedings against prosecutors, typically for more egregious forms of
misconduct,82 the perception, as Monroe Freedman observed fifteen years ago, is
“that prosecutors are far too infrequently subjected to professional discipline and
that courts cannot responsibly defer to disciplinary authorities to oversee
prosecutorial misconduct that deprives individuals of fundamental rights.”83
This perception arises, in part, out of the mismatch between reported
wrongdoing and reports of disciplinary punishment. Courts and scholars have
identified a wide array of prosecutorial misconduct that violates a variety of

2009) (suspending prosecutor for forgoing prosecutions in exchange for contributions to sheriff’s
fund).
77
See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988). See generally
Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 42.
78
See infra Part IV.
79
See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317 (Conn. 1995). See
infra Part IV.
80
See, e.g., In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997). This argument seems to have been put
to rest by the Citizens Protection Act, popularly known as the McDade Amendment, 28 U.S.C. §
530B. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 44, at 211–24 (discussing history and effect of
Act); Hopi Costello, Note, Judicial Interpretation of State Ethics Rules Under the McDade
Amendment: Do Federal or State Courts Get the Last Word?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 236 (2015).
81
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 10, at 161; Green, supra note 54; Meares, supra note 17; Joel
B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or
the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM. L. REV. 537 (2011);
Yaroshefsky, supra note 9; Brooke Williams & Shawn Musgrave, Wayward Prosecutors Go
Unpunished as Prison Time for Victims Piles Up, THE EYE (Apr. 3, 2016),
http://eye.necir.org/2016/04/03/wayward-prosecutors-go-unpunished-prison-time-victims-piles/.
82
See MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6. See infra Part IV.
83
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor
Zacharias, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121, 122 (2001).
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disciplinary rules.84 For example, courts have documented numerous violations of
prosecutors’ discovery obligations, which defense lawyers and some courts assume
to be the tip of the iceberg. 85 Courts have identified frequent improprieties in
prosecutors’ jury arguments, typically finding that the improprieties were
“harmless error.” 86 Prosecutors have been found to commit various other
improprieties, both in and out of court.87 In contrast, studies suggest, prosecutors
have relatively rarely faced public discipline. In a 2001 article, Fred Zacharias
concluded that over the course of more than a century, prosecutors had been
publicly disciplined for professional misconduct around 100 times, with the largest
category of cases involving blatantly illegal conduct such as bribery, extortion, or
embezzlement. 88 More recent studies have found that the problem persists. 89

84

Bennett Gershman has been chronicling prosecutorial misconduct for more than three
decades. See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1988).
85
See, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the
land. Only judges can put a stop to it.”). See generally Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987)
(concluding from reported decisions that prosecutors frequently withhold exculpatory evidence and
present false evidence); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement
of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833 (1997).
86
See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); United States v. Modica, 663
F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (describing “situation with which this Court is all too familiar: a
prosecutor has delivered an improper summation, despite this Court’s oft-expressed concern over the
frequency with which improper prosecution summations occur”); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“At times it seems as if certain counsel consider the harmless and
fundamental error rules to be a license to violate both the substantive law and the ethical rules that
prohibit improper argument.”); id. at 897 (Altenbernd, A.C.J., concurring) (“There are about a dozen
bad tactics that this court sees with regularity in closing arguments.”).
87
See generally GERSHMAN, supra note 84.
88
Zacharias, supra note 6, at 744–46. See also Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct
by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 670–71 (1972) (finding only one reported
instance of a prosecutor being disciplined for courtroom misconduct); CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY,
ERROR:
INVESTIGATING
AMERICA’S
LOCAL
PROSECUTORS
(2003),
HARMFUL
https://www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/harmful-error.
89
See, e.g., David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203 (2011); KATHLEEN RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE
ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009 (Oct. 2010),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncippubs; see also PROJ.
ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, HUNDREDS OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ATTORNEYS VIOLATED PROFESSIONAL
RULES, LAWS, OR ETHICAL STANDARDS (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.pogo.org/ourwork/reports/2014/hundreds-of-justice-attorneys-violated-standards.html; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, https://www.aclu.org/issues/capitalpunishment/prosecutorial-misconduct-and-capital-punishment?redirect=blog/tag/prosecutorialmisconduct.
It should be noted that studies are ordinarily limited to reported disciplinary decisions. In some
jurisdictions, lawyers are subject to private sanctions—e.g., private reprimands—and studies do not
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Moreover, judicial decisions finding that prosecutors engaged in misconduct may
understate the extent of the problem, since there are many cases where courts
simply decline to adjudicate claims of misconduct, others where defense lawyers
perceive misconduct but do not file a complaint, and still others where misconduct
is not visible to the defense or the court.
Of course, it is not surprising that disciplinary agencies sometimes decline to
pursue prosecutorial misconduct. In general, ethics rules, like criminal laws, are
enforced selectively, both because of limited resources and out of a sense of
proportionality.
Understandably, disciplinary authorities do not demand
perfection, but instead pursue the most blameworthy lawyers and the most serious
wrongdoing. Many violations of advocacy rules, whether committed by
prosecutors or by other lawyers, do not seem to warrant formal discipline. For
example, it is not unusual for prosecutors, defense lawyers, and civil lawyers alike
to unknowingly make impermissible jury arguments or withhold discoverable
evidence, based on either an aggressive reading of the law or a misunderstanding
of the applicable standards. In many such scenarios, and even in some cases of
minor, albeit intentional, wrongdoing, courts adequately address the misconduct,
often informally, at the time it is discovered.90 Thus, one might reasonably expect
and accept that disciplinary proceedings will be limited to instances of misconduct
that are intentional, recurring, and/or extremely prejudicial. The problem,
however, is that disciplinary authorities have appeared to ignore even serious
prosecutorial wrongdoing, as long as the conduct falls short of criminal law
breaking.
This situation may appear to be changing. In 2007, elected District Attorney
Mike Nifong of Durham, North Carolina, was disbarred for misconduct in the
course of a nationally publicized sex-crime prosecution of Duke University
lacrosse players who, it turned out, were innocent.91 Nifong’s misconduct included
making false statements, withholding exculpatory evidence, and making
impermissible statements to the press. 92 Though at the time, some viewed

capture unreported cases, if any, in which prosecutors were privately reprimanded for misconduct.
That said, there is nothing to suggest that in jurisdictions that allow for private disciplinary sanctions,
prosecutors are sanctioned privately with any degree of frequency.
90
See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Ward, 353 P.3d 509, 521–22 (Okla. 2015) (citing
In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1173 (Colo. 2002)) (maintaining that discovery violations should be
handled by the trial court).
91
See, e.g., WILLIAM D. COHAN, THE PRICE OF SILENCE: THE DUKE LACROSSE SCANDAL, THE
POWER OF THE ELITE, AND THE CORRUPTION OF OUR GREAT UNIVERSITIES (2014); STUART TAYLOR JR.
& KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES
OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007).
92
Amended Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 22–24, N.C.
State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35, Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar (July 24,
2007), http://www.ncbar.gov/Nifong%20Final%20Order.pdf; Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke
Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1346, 1348, 1358 (2007).
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Nifong’s disbarment as an aberration, 93 there has been a more recent string of
disciplinary cases against even more powerful and higher-ranking elected
prosecutors. In 2012, Andrew Thomas, who had been a candidate for state
Attorney General two years earlier, was disbarred for misconduct committed while
serving as the elected prosecutor of Maricopa County in Phoenix, Arizona.94 In
2013, Phil Kline was indefinitely suspended from practicing law for misconduct
committed while serving first as state Attorney General and then as the prosecutor
of Kansas’s most populous county.95 And in 2015, Kathleen Kane, the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, was suspended from law practice on a temporary
emergency basis, pending criminal charges that she improperly leaked grand jury
information and then lied about her conduct.96 While each case involves unusual
and egregious misconduct, and accordingly might be deemed, individually, as
aberrational and therefore of limited significance, together these cases suggest that
courts and disciplinary authorities in the past decade have become less reluctant to
pursue professional discipline of prosecutors who engage in professional
improprieties.
Perhaps more notably, these disciplinary proceedings against elected
prosecutors appear to have been animated, to varying degrees, by concerns about
the abuse of discretionary power. In Nifong’s case, what most disturbed the
public—and, no doubt, the disciplinary authorities as well—was that he abused his
power by continuing the prosecution after the evidence discredited the complaining
witness and strongly suggested that the defendants were innocent. 97 Although
Nifong’s failure to drop the charges at that point was not the official ground for

93

See Davis, supra note 9, at 296–303; David Feige, One-Off Offing, SLATE (June 18, 2007,
6:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/06/oneoff_offing.html
(“Prosecutors almost never face public censure or disbarment for their actions. . . . Regardless of
Nifong’s sanction, the drama leaves prosecutorial misconduct commonplace, unseen, uncorrected,
and unpunished.”); Zacharias & Green, supra note 68, at 12.
94
In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012),
http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410Thomas-Aubuchon.PDF. Disciplinary charges were also
brought against one of his top deputies and a more junior lawyer. The top deputy was disbarred. In
re Aubuchon, 309 P.3d 886 (Ariz. 2013). The junior lawyer, who had a minor role, was suspended
for six months. In re Alexander, 300 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2012).
95
In re Kline, 311 P.3d 321 (Kan. 2013).
96
Order, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kane, No. 2202 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 (Pa.
Sept.
21,
2015),
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/2202DD3%20%201023669815398023.pdf. See also Petition for Emergency Temporary Suspension, Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kane, No. 2202 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 (Pa. Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-4359/file-4699.pdf?cb=5263db [hereinafter Petition]. For
earlier cases of high-ranking prosecutors disciplined for criminal conduct, see, for example, Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Preate, 731 A.2d 129 (Pa. 1999); Mitchell v. Ass’n of the Bar, 351 N.E.2d
743 (N.Y. 1976).
97
See Feige, supra note 93 (observing that “if the Duke case had gone to a jury and the
defendants had been convicted, Nifong would not only still have his law license—he’d have been
lionized for his dogged pursuit of rich white kids”).
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discipline, the perception that Nifong abused his charging power probably
influenced both the aggressiveness of the disciplinary prosecution and the
seriousness of the eventual sanction. As Angela Davis noted, most of the charges
leading to Nifong’s disbarment—other than those regarding his false statements—
involved conduct that does not ordinarily catch disciplinary authorities’ attention.98
For example, Nifong was sanctioned in part for misusing the press, even though
prosecutors usually receive nothing worse than a judicial tongue-lashing for
improprieties in press conferences.99 Nifong’s disbarment was also grounded on
his failure to make timely pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence, conduct that
rarely results in discipline.100
In the disciplinary proceedings against former Maricopa County Attorney
Andrew Thomas, the abuse of charging power was not only central to the
disciplinary charges but also provided one of the principal grounds for his
disbarment.101 In brief, Thomas led his office to battle against members of the
Board of Supervisors, with whom he disagreed over whether the Board could
retain outside counsel rather than being represented by Thomas’s office or his
appointees. Among other indiscretions, he investigated and brought criminal
charges, most of which were time-barred, against his principal political nemesis,
the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, and later re-indicted the Chairman and
indicted a second Supervisor. Then, to forestall a hearing into a motion brought to
curtail his investigative efforts, Thomas filed criminal charges against the judge
assigned to conduct the hearing, compelling the judge’s recusal. The disciplinary
panel found that the charges against the judge were entirely baseless, and that even
if the charges against the Supervisors were factually supported, it was improper for
Thomas to bring them.
The Arizona disciplinary authorities employed, and the disciplinary panel
upheld, an unconventional theory to sanction Thomas for abusing his charging
power in proceeding against the two Supervisors. Specifically, the panel
concluded that even if a prosecution was supported by probable cause, a
disciplinary panel can look to the prosecutor’s subjective motivations and impose
discipline when the prosecutor’s reason for bringing criminal charges was to serve
his self-interest or to serve some other illegitimate purpose.102 Applied to Thomas,

98

See Davis, supra note 9, at 297–99.
See Abigail H. Lipman, Note, Extrajudicial Comments and the Special Responsibilities of
Prosecutors: Failings of the Model Rules in Today’s Media Age, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1537–
41 (2010).
100
See Freedman, supra note 83.
101
The disciplinary panel’s opinion reviewing 33 charges against Thomas and two of his top
aides spans more than 200 pages and more than 500 paragraphs, but the story is well-summarized by
the concurring opinion of the panel’s non-lawyer member. See In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas,
PDJ-2011-9002, 233–246 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012), http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410ThomasAubuchon.PDF.
102
See id. at 69.
99
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the panel found, first, that his principal purposes for prosecuting the Supervisors
were improper, i.e., to exact “political revenge,” 103 and second, that he had a
conflict of interest arising out of his “personal animosity.” 104 Nevertheless, the
hearing panel regarded Thomas’s misconduct as aberrational—like that of Mike
Nifong, to whom Thomas’s disciplinary hearing panel alluded in its report105—and
it predicted that “its ruling will offer little insight or guidance for other
prosecutors,” who would be “shocked by [Thomas’s] methods and actions.” 106
Thus, the panel downplayed both the significance of the legal theory upon which it
sanctioned Thomas’s abuses of charging discretion, and the potential applicability
of that theory to future cases in which prosecutors undertake a personal or political
vendetta.
In Kline’s case, the alleged misconduct related to his criminal investigation of
abortion providers “spanning a period of nearly [six] years with prosecutorial
proceedings before six separate courts.” 107 He was sanctioned principally for
dishonesty and lack of candor in various proceedings, and for allowing sealed
documents to be attached to a public filing. None of the disciplinary charges
(some of which were found to be unsubstantiated) expressly targeted Kline’s abuse
of discretion in crusading against abortion providers, and the court steered clear of
criticizing Kline for overzealousness and misdirecting his office’s resources. Nor
did the opinion make the obvious point that, while prosecutors are expected to
promote public safety and order, Kline exploited the criminal process in a political
vendetta that stoked public outrage and violence. The State Supreme Court’s
lengthy opinion recounted that Kline’s investigation of Dr. George Tiller led to Dr.
Tiller’s indictment, trial, and acquittal,108 but the opinion failed to add that Dr.
Tiller was assassinated a few months later. 109 Only at the end of the opinion,
where it alluded to Kline’s “fervid belief or desire to see his cause succeed,”110 did
the court even obliquely suggest that Kline’s wrongs included the misdirection of
prosecutorial power in a personal, political crusade. Perhaps the disciplinary
authorities and the court were indifferent to this concern—or rather, perhaps they
were tacitly influenced by it.
Finally, the disciplinary charges against Attorney General Kane related to her
abuse of prosecutorial power, following her indictment for intentionally disclosing

103

Id. at 68.
Id. at 73–74.
105
See id. at 11–12.
106
Id. at 22.
107
In re Kline, 311 P.3d 321, 328 (Kan. 2013).
108
See id. at 336.
109
See Joe Stumpe & Monica Davey, Abortion Doctor Shot to Death in Kansas Church, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/us/01tiller.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
110
Kline, 311 P.3d at 395.
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secret grand jury information. The disciplinary board’s petition alleged that after
taking office, Kane questioned her predecessor’s handling of a 2009 grand jury
probe into the alleged misuse of state funds. One of the subjects of the earlier
investigation was a current member of a state commission who, at the time of the
2009 grand jury probe, headed a local NAACP chapter. Recognizing that it was
impossible to reverse her predecessor’s earlier decision not to indict the
commissioner, Kane authorized her office to publish a report describing the
evidence before the grand jury, allegedly for no legitimate purpose but solely to
embarrass him.111
These recent examples do not necessarily signal that, as a general matter,
disciplinary authorities are becoming more aggressive in pursuing prosecutorial
misconduct. After all, these few cases involved extreme and public misconduct by
high-ranking public officials, with perhaps limited implications for how
disciplinary authorities will deal with less egregious wrongdoing by subordinate
prosecutors in cases that escape public attention.
There are, however, some additional signs that, more generally, disciplinary
authorities may be taking prosecutorial misconduct more seriously. Although the
number of disciplinary cases still remains small compared with the incidence of
perceived wrongdoing, it seems that more disciplinary proceedings were brought
against prosecutors in the past decade than in previous years.112 Importantly, some
of these cases involved prosecutorial misconduct that courts may have considered
fairly low-level.113 While many courts still appear to punish prosecutors lightly
when wrongdoing is found, 114 others regard prosecutorial misconduct as
particularly deserving of punishment because it entails a breach of public trust.115
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See Petition, supra note 96. In In re Russell, 797 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 2011), a young elected
prosecutor who pursued a criminal case “to enhance and defend his political career,” id. at 90, misled
a judge to secure the improper release of grand jury transcripts in “an effort to protect his personal
reputation from increasing public criticism.” Id. at 89. The court imposed a public censure,
attributing the prosecutor’s misconduct largely to inexperience. Id. at 91. Kane was convicted of
criminal conduct and recently sentenced. See Associated Press, Former Pennsylvania Attorney
(Oct.
24,
2016),
General
Sentenced
in
Perjury
Case,
POLITICO
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/kathleen-kane-sentence-perjury-pennsylvania-attorneygeneral-230252.
112
See, e.g., cases cited infra, notes 113–19. It should be noted that research into disciplinary
decisions is difficult, and generalizations about frequency may miss the mark because not all
disciplinary decisions are available through Westlaw and LEXIS. In particular, some decisions are
posted on judicial websites but not publicly reported. Therefore, they are not easily located. In
addition, some disciplinary decisions, particularly those involving low-level sanctions, may possibly
be found only in court files, and not posted electronically. An effort is underway on the website,
www.prosecutorialaccountability.com, to identify reports of prosecutorial discipline, but the website
is not comprehensive.
113
See, e.g., In re Black, 156 P.3d 641 (Kan. 2007) (publicly censuring prosecutor for
mishandling funds).
114
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Phillabaum, 144 Ohio St.3d 417, 2015-Ohio-4346 (Ohio
2015) (one-year suspension for prosecutor who was convicted of falsifying a grand jury indictment);
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As another sign of increased and more serious attention to prosecutorial
misconduct, disciplinary authorities have sometimes brought proceedings even
when the scope of the applicable disciplinary rules was uncertain. In particular,
proceedings have been brought when prosecutors withheld favorable evidence that,
in hindsight, was not material to the outcome of the trial, and thus its suppression
was not a violation of constitutional obligations under Brady v. Maryland. Two of
the disciplinary cases were brought against federal prosecutors, and incurred the
opposition of the U.S. Department of Justice,116 while others were brought against
local prosecutors. 117 In some cases, courts adopted the disciplinary authorities’
reading of Rule 3.8(d), 118 demanding broader disclosure than required under
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 360 P.3d 508 (Okla. 2015) (reprimanding two prosecutors for
lack of candor); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Layton, 324 P.3d 1244 (Okla. 2014) (finding that
under the circumstances the prosecutor’s lack of candor did not merit any discipline); State ex rel.
Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108, 120 (Okla. 2013) (terming prosecutor’s suppression of
evidence in a murder case “reprehensible,” but imposing only a 180-day suspension largely because
the misconduct occurred decades earlier); In re Att’y F, 285 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2012) (en banc)
(remanding for consideration of whether a private reprimand, rather than a public censure, is the
appropriate sanction for lying to defense counsel); In re Humphrey, 811 N.W.2d 363, 375 (Wis.
2012) (imposing 30-day suspension for misleading trial judge); In re Kohler, 762 N.W.2d 377 (Wis.
2009) (publicly reprimanding prosecutor who disobeyed a court order, withheld discovery and lied to
the judge); In re Williams, 663 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 2008) (imposing six-month suspension of assistant
prosecutor following his misdemeanor conviction for assisting the elected prosecutor in
misappropriating County funds). But see State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Wintory, 350 P.3d 131
(Okla. 2015) (suspending Arizona prosecutor for two years for lack of candor, after the Arizona court
suspended him for only 90 days for the same conduct); In re Smith, 29 So. 2d 1232 (La. 2010)
(suspending lawyer for briefly moonlighting as criminal defense lawyer after becoming a prosecutor).
115
See, e.g., In re Howes, 39 A.3d 1, 18 (D.C. 2012) (disbarring federal prosecutor for
misusing witness funds and making false statements in connection with witness vouchers, and noting
that his “role as a prosecutor heightens the need for deterrence and the potential for harm to the
public as a result of his misconduct”); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Busch, 754 S.E.2d 729, 742 (W.
Va. 2014) (imposing three-year suspension for violation of discovery rule and other misconduct, in
light of the importance of public trust in public officials).
Many of these disciplinary cases have escaped notice, particularly among the press and the
public. Indeed, it seems the national media pays attention only when a prosecutor is disciplined for
misconduct in a high-profile case. There was much media coverage when former elected Texas
prosecutor Charles Sebesta was disbarred in 2015 for wrongdoing that contributed to the wrongful
murder conviction of Anthony Graves, who spent more than 18 years on death row. Likewise,
attention was paid in 2013 when former Texas prosecutor Ken Anderson was disbarred for
misconduct contributing to the wrongful murder conviction of Michael Morton, who spent 25 years
in prison before being exonerated.
116
Brief and Appendices of Amicus Curiae U.S. in Support of Respondent Andrew J. Kline, In
re Kline, Bd. Docket No. 11-BD-007 (D.C. June 7, 2012), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/usaamicus-kline-1.pdf; Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee Jeffrey Auerhahn and
Affirmance, In re Auerhahn, No. 11-2206, No. 1:09-MC-10206-RWZ-WGY-GAO (1st Cir. July 23,
2012), 2012 WL 2871540.
117
See, e.g., In re Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672 (N.D. 2012); Disciplinary Counsel v. KelloggMartin, 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010).
118
See, e.g., In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202 (D.C. 2015) (adopting ABA interpretation); In re
Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672. See generally Green, supra note 45.
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constitutional precedent, and in other cases, they rejected it.119 In Massachusetts,
after the federal court read the rule narrowly,120 the state judiciary amended the
rule to clarify that it embodied ethical obligations beyond the contours of the
constitutional requirements.121 Disciplinary authorities’ willingness to proceed on
a contested legal theory, particularly in the face of anticipated government
opposition, seems significant, defying expectations that disciplinary proceedings
will be initiated only when prosecutors’ misconduct is beyond dispute.
It is unlikely that professional discipline will ever be a complete answer to all
of the problems, real and perceived, of prosecutorial misconduct. The defense bar,
reform organizations, and other vocal critics of prosecutorial abuse of power
increasingly view prosecutorial misconduct as a systemic problem, and therefore
they advocate for systemic reforms as an alternative preferable to enhanced
disciplinary enforcement.122 Still, one might anticipate that, as public and judicial
concerns continue to grow over prosecutorial misconduct, discipline will play an
increasingly significant role when prosecutors plainly violate established law and
ethics rules governing their conduct as trial lawyers. A more difficult question,
addressed in Part IV, is whether ethics rules can and should be expanded,
interpreted more liberally, or applied more creatively, to regulate a category of
conduct that is often regarded as troubling but is insufficiently addressed by other
means: namely, abuses of prosecutorial discretion.
IV. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR ABUSES OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION:
A HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
In recent years, prosecutors have faced increasing accusations not only of
violating specific legal and ethical obligations, such as the duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence, 123 but also of generally abusing their authority, including
their broad discretion to decide whether to bring criminal charges and what charges
to bring.124 For example, not-for-profit organizations, media representatives, and
members of the public criticized the elected prosecutor in Ferguson for failing to
press for an indictment of a police officer responsible for killing an unarmed

119

See, e.g., In re Auerhahn, 724 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2013); Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125
(holding that materiality is required under disciplinary rule); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Ward,
353 P.3d 509 (Okla. 2015) (holding that materiality is required under disciplinary rule).
120
In re Auerhahn, 724 F.3d 103.
121
See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) cmt. 3A (2016).
122
See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxvi-xxxii. See generally Bruce A. Green & Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
123
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
124
See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
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civilian, Michael Brown. 125 The U.S. Department of Justice reported that the
Missoula County Attorney’s Office failed to adequately prosecute sexual assault
cases.126 Congressional committees launched investigations into accusations that
federal prosecutors were under-zealous in investigating alleged improprieties by
I.R.S. officials, 127 and that federal prosecutors overcharged internet “hacktivist”
Aaron Swartz, driving him to suicide.128
As a threshold matter, it seems clear that prosecutors should generally be
subject to professional sanction when they deliberately violate established
constitutional and other legal standards regarding discovery, closing arguments,
and other aspects of professional conduct, in and out of court.129 Discipline plays
an important role in promoting lawful conduct and in protecting the public from
prosecutors who deliberately act unlawfully. For similar reasons, prosecutors
should be subject to discipline when they violate the law through gross or repeated
negligence.
It is less clear, however, whether courts can and should sanction prosecutors
for abuses of discretionary charging power. Most areas of charging and pleabargaining decisions are only lightly governed by enforceable law. 130 When

125

See Letter from Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Dir.-Counsel, NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, to
Hon. Maura McShane, 21st Judicial Circuit, St. Louis County Court (Jan. 5, 2015),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/251842888/NAACP-LDF-Open-Letter-to-Judge-Maura-McShane; Nadia
Prupis, Ferguson Prosecutor Hit With Ethics Complaint, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/01/06/ferguson-prosecutor-hit-ethics-complaint. A suit
seeking to remove the prosecutor from office was denied. See Dismissal of Suit Seeking Removal of
McCulloch, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 6, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/dismissal-of-suitseeking-removal-of-mcculloch/pdf_76d7eb63-b522-5371-b52d-2589910e5757.html.
126
See Letter from Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Att’y, Dist. of Mont. to Fred Van Valkenburg, Cty
Att’y,
Missoula
County,
Mont.
(Feb.
14,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/02/19/missoula_ltr_2-14-14.pdf.
127
See S. REP. No. 114-119, pt. 1 (2015).
128
See Brian Fung & Andrea Peterson, After Long Delay, Obama Declines to Rule on Petition
Calling for Firing of DOJ Officials Over Aaron Swartz’s Suicide, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Jan. 8,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/08/in-a-long-delayed-petitionresponse-obama-refuses-to-fire-u-s-attorneys-over-aaron-swartz/; Zach Carter, Al Franken Sends Eric
Holder Letter Over ‘Remarkably Aggressive’ Aaron Swartz Prosecution, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22,
2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/22/al-franken-eric-holder_n_2934627.html;
Zach Carter, John Cornyn Criticizes Eric Holder Over Aaron Swartz’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 18, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/18/john-cornyn-eric-holder-aaronswartz_n_2505528.html; see also Lincoln Caplan, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y.
TIMES:
TAKING
NOTE
(Jan.
18,
2013,
10:06
AM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/aaron-swartz-and-prosecutorial-discretion/ (accusing
prosecutors of overcharging); Stephen L. Carter, The Overzealous Prosecution of Aaron Swartz,
BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201301-17/the-overzealous-prosecution-of-aaron-swartz.html.
129
See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
130
See Podgor, supra note 19; Poulin, supra note 19.
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prosecutors exercise charging power in violation of constitutional or statutory
law—for example, when they initiate charges without probable cause or selectively
prosecute in violation of constitutional norms—one might assume that they should
be subject to personal discipline. But most charging decisions that critics regard as
excessively lenient, excessively harsh, arbitrary, or otherwise abusive are generally
thought to be within the broad scope of prosecutorial discretion, unregulated by
any established legal restrictions. 131 Indeed, even when critical of prosecutors’
exercise of charging discretion, judges ordinarily do not review and supersede
prosecutors’ charging decisions.132 As a result, courts have not developed a robust
jurisprudence establishing when prosecutors abuse their discretionary power.
Likewise, courts and commentators have not deeply analyzed the extent to which
professional discipline may be meted out for abuses of charging discretion.
As discussed in Part III, courts conceivably have the ability to establish
independent disciplinary standards governing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, either by liberally interpreting current ethics rules or by adopting new
rules. The question is whether doing so is within judicial authority under state
constitutional law. On one hand, state courts have general authority to discipline
prosecutors for professional misconduct, including constitutional violations. 133
Moreover, it is generally accepted that courts have supervisory authority to adopt
and apply ethics rules that go beyond existing constitutional and statutory law,
regulating the conduct of trial lawyers, including prosecutors, in their dealings with
the courts and other parties.134 On the other hand, given the apparent limits on
adjudicatory review of charging decisions, it is less certain that state courts have

131

See supra notes 12–20 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Redondo-Lemos,
955 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended on denial of reh’g) (“Our only available course is to
deny the defendant a judicial remedy for what may be a violation of a constitutional right—not to
have charging or plea bargaining decisions made in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”).
132
See infra notes 133–46 and accompanying text; Soares v. Carter, 32 N.E.3d 390, 392 (N.Y.
2015) (citations omitted) (“Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts lack the authority to
compel the prosecution of criminal actions. Such a right is solely within the broad authority and
discretion of the district attorney’s executive power to conduct all phases of criminal prosecution.”).
133
See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988) (noting that
prosecutors can be disciplined for misconduct in the grand jury); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 506 n.5 (1983) (noting availability of professional discipline for improper jury argument that, in
the context of the case, was harmless error); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976)
(upholding prosecutorial immunity from civil liability for using false evidence and withholding
exculpatory evidence, but noting that prosecutors are subject to discipline for violating constitutional
rights).
134
For example, state rules based on ABA Model Rule 4.2, restricting lawyers’
communications with represented persons, have been held to apply to prosecutors, notwithstanding
that the rules are more restrictive than the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997); In re Brey, 490 N.W.2d 15 (Wis.
1992). See generally Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal
Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291
(1992).
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the authority to establish and enforce disciplinary standards for abuses of
prosecutors’ charging discretion.
The absence of a robust disciplinary
jurisprudence regarding abuses of prosecutorial discretion may simply reflect state
courts’ traditional reluctance to police prosecutors, but it may also reflect state
courts’ doubts about the scope of their own authority to enforce standards
governing prosecutors’ charging decisions in particular.
This Part examines the assumption, largely influenced by federal case law,
that state courts lack the authority or ability to employ the disciplinary process to
regulate prosecutors’ charging decisions. 135 It focuses on two questions: first,
whether the separation-of-powers considerations that restrain federal courts in
adjudication should similarly discourage state courts from undertaking disciplinary
inquiries into prosecutors’ decision making; and second, assuming such inquiries
may be undertaken, whether state courts, pursuant to their power to adopt ethics
rules, may apply their own standards governing prosecutors’ decision making or
are limited to enforcing constitutional and statutory standards.
A. State Court Disciplinary Review of Prosecutorial Decision Making
It is often assumed, based on the federal court model, that courts have
minimal authority to review prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining decisions
and other discretionary decisions.136 The federal constitutional case law sets a high
bar to a criminal defendant who claims to have been charged selectively,
vindictively, or discriminatorily in violation of the Constitution, 137 and the
constitution affords no judicial review at all of a prosecutor’s decision to refrain
from filing a criminal charge when victims or members of the public believe that
prosecutors have not lived up to their responsibilities. 138 Federal courts have
limited statutory authority to oversee certain discretionary decisions, such as a
prosecutor’s decision to dismiss charges after they have been filed,139 and some
federal courts regard this authority as meaningful, 140 but most federal courts
remain highly deferential to prosecutors’ charging decisions.141
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See Barkow, supra note 12.
See, e.g., United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended on
denial of reh’g); see also Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016), 1234–39 nn.19–43 and accompanying text (citing U.S. Supreme Court
and other federal court cases).
137
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21 (1974).
138
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
139
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an
indictment, information, or complaint.” (emphasis added)).
140
See United States v. Abreu, 747 F. Supp. 493, 502 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (“[I]t seems altogether
proper to say the phrase ‘by leave of court’ in Rule 48(a) was intended to modify and condition the
absolute power of the executive, consistently with the framers’ concept of separation of powers, by
136
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The premise of prosecutorial discretion is that once there is sufficient
evidence to support criminal charges, a variety of public policy considerations go
into the determination of whether the public interest is served by bringing or
pursuing a criminal case,142 and that prosecutors are best positioned to make this
judgment. 143 Courts recognize the potential for prosecutors to abuse their
discretion; at times, for example, prosecutors exercise discretion not just unwisely,
but arbitrarily or in bad faith.144 The appropriate remedy, however, may be found
in the political, rather than the judicial, process. 145
If, indeed, courts are unable to meaningfully remedy prosecutors’ abuses of
charging and plea bargaining discretion in criminal cases over which they preside,
it might follow that courts likewise do not have the ability to punish prosecutors’
abuses of discretion through the after-the-fact disciplinary process. Presumably,
the justifications for judicial deference to prosecutors’ discretionary decisions
apply just as strongly in the disciplinary context as in criminal adjudication.
Courts and scholars have identified various reasons that, both as a matter of
constitutional separation of powers and as a matter of prudence, federal courts only
lightly review prosecutors’ discretionary decisions. 146 As executive branch
erecting a check on the abuse of executive prerogatives.”); United States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp.
851, 856 (D. Utah 1989) (“Rather than the court’s action constituting a usurpation of the Executive
power and interference with prosecutorial discretion . . . in this court’s view the narrow interpretation
of ‘leave of court’ as advocated in the Joint Motion and applied in this case would constitute violation
of principles of separation of powers because of interference with judicial discretion.” (emphasis in
original)).
141
See Barkow, supra note 22, at 872 (“[F]ederal judges continue to rubber stamp cooperation,
charging, and plea decisions.”). See, e.g., United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 743
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[C]onstrue the ‘approval of the court’ language in [18 U.S.C.] § 3161(h)(2) in a
manner that preserves the Executive’s long-settled primacy over charging decisions and that denies
courts substantial power to impose their own charging preferences.”).
142
See, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d
ed. 1993).
143
See, e.g., Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
144
See, e.g., State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wallach, 182 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1944).
145
See, e.g., Editorial, Voters Tell D.A.s, Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2016, at
A26 (veteran prosecutors in Cleveland and Chicago were denied renomination in Democratic
primaries for mishandling cases of police shootings of civilians).
146
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 970–71 (citing various rationales courts have invoked for
the deferential approach to reviewing prosecutors’ charging decisions, including judges’ views that
“they are less competent to weigh all the relevant factors,” the concern that “revealing prosecutorial
information could ‘chill law enforcement . . . [and] undermine prosecutorial effectiveness’” and case
law holding that “[t]he separation of powers . . . forbids judicial interference with prosecutorial
discretion to decline to file charges”); id. at 973 (“Judicially enforceable models of equality are
poorly suited to balance the myriad practical and policy considerations that prosecutors legitimately
take into account.”); Davis, supra note 13, at 408–15 (citing various ways the law insulates
prosecutors’ abuse of discretion from effective judicial review, including the harmless error doctrine,
obstacles to discovery, civil immunity, and a general reluctance among courts to exercise their
supervisory power out of concern for the separation of powers); Podgor, supra note 19, at 463;
Poulin, supra note 19, at 1119; Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1546 (“Courts often justify their refusal
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officials, prosecutors, not courts, are generally entrusted with charging authority,
and the review of those decisions would entangle courts in core executive decisionmaking.147 In addition, courts arguably have no greater expertise than prosecutors
in determining how to identify and balance relevant public policy considerations
that bear on charging decisions.148 Relatedly, prosecutors have greater access to
the facts relevant to charging decisions—both the facts of the particular case and
general background facts. 149 As a result, judicial fact-finding would be timeconsuming and duplicative, and would potentially intrude on the confidentiality of
particular criminal investigations and the general workings of the prosecutor’s
office.150
To the extent these considerations are compelling in the context of criminal
adjudication, they would seem likewise to weigh against disciplinary review of
prosecutors’ charging decisions and other discretionary decisions.151 This is not to
to review prosecutorial discretion on the ground that separation-of-powers concerns prohibit such
review. . . . The hands-off approach of the courts seems to reflect their view . . . that it would be
unwise to interfere with prosecutors’ ability to manage the business of criminal justice.”). See also
Stephens, supra note 17, at 57 n.31, 64 n.82 (citing cases).
147
See, e.g., United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299–1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (as
amended on denial of reh’g) (“It would raise serious separation of powers questions—as well as a
host of virtually insurmountable practical problems—for the district court to inquire into and
supervise the inner workings of the United States Attorney’s Office. . . . The court would also have to
consider the validity of various rationales advanced for particular charging decisions, which would
enmesh it deeply into the policies, practices and procedures of the United States Attorney’s Office. . .
. Such judicial entanglement in the core decisions of another branch of government—especially as to
those bearing directly and substantially on matters litigated in federal court—is inconsistent with the
division of responsibilities assigned to each branch by the Constitution.”).
148
See, e.g., id. at 1299 (“Prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions are particularly
ill-suited for broad judicial oversight. In the first place, they involve exercises of judgment and
discretion that are often difficult to articulate in a manner suitable for judicial evaluation.”); id. at
1300 (“[T]he court would have to second-guess the prosecutor’s judgment in a variety of cases to
determine whether the reasons advanced therefor are a subterfuge.”).
149
Id. at 1299 (“Such decisions are normally made as a result of careful professional judgment
as to the strength of the evidence, the availability of resources, the visibility of the crime and the
likely deterrent effect on the particular defendant and others similarly situated.”).
150
Id. at 1299–1300 (“The very breadth of the inquiry—whether the prosecutor’s discretion
was exercised in an arbitrary or capricious fashion—would require that the government divulge
minute details about the process by which scores, perhaps hundreds, of charging decisions are
made.”).
151
Notably, some lower federal courts seem to assume that state courts have disciplinary
authority to punish prosecutors’ abuses of charging discretion, notwithstanding the high level of
deference traditionally accorded in federal criminal adjudication. See, e.g., Soulier v. Haukaas, 477
Fed. Appx. 388, 390 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding prosecutor entitled to immunity for any violation of
plea-bargaining power “because plea bargaining is intimately associated with a prosecutorial
function. . . . [a]nd other means of correcting injustice, such as . . . professional discipline, are
available to hold accountable prosecutors who abuse their power”); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37,
42 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30–A, § 257) (identifying “professional discipline
of the miscreant prosecutor as the readily available safeguards against constitutional abuse” and
distinguishing between “the federal judicial system where the power of the courts to control a
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say that these considerations are implicated to precisely the same degree in each
context. For example, confidentiality concerns are arguably less serious in the
disciplinary context, where review can be undertaken in camera.152 On the other
hand, concerns about chilling prosecutors may be even more compelling in the
disciplinary context, as the risk of personal consequences may chill some
prosecutors from making some hard, but legitimate, decisions, and may altogether
discourage other capable lawyers from becoming prosecutors.153
Still, notwithstanding these considerations, there are reasons to question the
common assumption that discipline cannot address abuses of prosecutorial
discretion. Significantly, most criminal prosecutions are adjudicated by state
courts, some of which have not adopted federal courts’ deferential approach to
prosecutorial decision-making based on separation of powers considerations. As
Darryl Brown has recently documented, “some states have recognized the judicial
capacity for a modest supervisory role over critical aspects of prosecutorial
discretion” and “some state courts have departed from federal conceptions of
separation of powers.” 154 In fact, it appears that many state courts recognize
adjudicatory authority, pursuant to state statute or common law, to review various
aspects of prosecutors’ charging decisions.
For example, in some states, courts may inquire into whether the prosecutor
acted improperly in failing to initiate criminal charges and, upon finding an
impropriety, they may direct the prosecutor to bring the case to trial155 or appoint a
special prosecutor to do so.156 Typically, review of the non-charging decision is

prosecutor’s term are strictly limited” and the enhanced judicial authority in state law, including
Maine statute “provid[ing] a highly specific mechanism to evaluate a prosecutor’s work[,]. . . .
permit[ting] a judicial proceeding to be commenced against a District Attorney, upon complaint by
the Attorney General, to determine whether the District Attorney is ‘performing the duties of office
faithfully and efficiently’ and to remove him if he is not”).
152
See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317, 335 (Conn. 1995)
(rejecting argument that disciplinary review of prosecutors would have adverse effect on the
confidentiality of prosecutors’ charging decisions, noting that, unlike an adjudicatory proceeding held
in open court, “[s]ensitive material contained within a response to a grievance complaint . . . can be
sealed upon motion”).
153
See, e.g., Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d at 1299 (“[A] court would find it nearly impossible to
lay down guidelines to be followed by prosecutors in future cases. We would be left with prosecutors
not knowing when to prosecute and judges not having time to judge.”). The Supreme Court has
identified similar concerns as underlying the doctrine of immunity for prosecutors. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–24 (1976).
154
Brown, supra note 136, at 1250–51. See id. at 1251–53 nn.94–103 and accompanying text.
155
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 767.41; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606. See also,
Brown, supra note 136, at 1252 n.99.
156
See, e.g., TN CONST. art. 6, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 16; ALA. CODE § 12-17-186(a);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-805; State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 364–65 (1977) (citing
MINN. STAT. § 388.12); Kailey v. Chambers, 261 P.3d 792 (Colo. App. 2011) (citing COLO. REV.
STAT. Ann. § 16-5-209); State v. Muller, 588 A.2d 393, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Wilson
v. Koppy, 653 N.W.2d 68, 72 (N.D. 2002) (citing N.D. CENT CODE § 11-16-06).
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initiated by complaint of a private party,157 growing out of the tradition of private
prosecution that extends back to the nineteenth-century.158 Similarly, various state
courts have authority to deny the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss a criminal charge
where there is sufficient evidence to support continuing the prosecution.159
Insofar as state courts’ review of charging decisions is based on an evaluation
of the strength of the evidence—e.g., whether there is probable cause or a prima
facie case of guilt—it might seem that the courts are making a traditionally
adjudicatory decision, rather than questioning the prosecutor’s exercise of
judgment. 160 It is clear, however, that state court review of prosecutors’
discretionary decisions is not always limited to weighing the evidence of guilt. In
some states, trial courts have the authority to supersede a prosecutor’s charging
decision by dismissing a charge on their own motion in the interests of justice161 or

157

See, e.g., N.J. MUN. CT. R. 7:2-2(a)(1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.09(D) (West 2015);
16 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1409; PA. R. CRIM. P. 506; WIS. STAT. § 968.02(3); WIS. STAT.
§ 968.26; State v. Murphy, 584 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Idaho 1978); State v. Martineau, 808 A.2d 51, 52–
53 (N.H. 2002); Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan,774 A.2d 866, 872 (R.I. 2001); Harman v. Frye, 425
S.E.2d 566, 576 (W. Va. 1992); State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 681 N.W.2d 110
(Wis. 2004).
158
See Beth A. Brown, Note, The Constitutional Validity of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 133(b)(2) and the Traditional Role of the Pennsylvania Courts in the Prosecutorial
Function, 52 U. PITT L. REV. 269 (1990); Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial
Inaction: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488 (1988); Comment, Private
Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955);
Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing
Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CAL. L. REV. 727 (1988).
159
See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 585(A); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); Manning v. Engelkes, 281
N.W.2d 7, 10–11 (Iowa 1979); Myers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d. 782, 792 n.13 (W. Va. 1984); State v.
Kenyon, 270 N.W.2d. 160, 163 (Wis. 1978). See also Manning, 281 N.W.2d at 13 (distinguishing
state and federal approaches to judicial role in prosecutorial dismissals); State v. Layman, 214
S.W.3d 442, 451 (Tenn. 2007). See generally Brown, supra note 136, at 1246–47 nn.76 & 78.
160
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stivala, 645 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (upholding PA. R.
CRIM. P. 313):
[I]t is apparent that the determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain
a prima facie case is ultimately a judicial one and subject to the trial court’s
determination. . . . Based on that pretrial state of the evidence, [the trial court] determined
that there was sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case and, therefore, denied
the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi. We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in ruling as it did.
Id. at 262.
161
See State v. Echols, 793 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (citing ALASKA R. CRIM.
P. 43(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385; IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 48(a)(2); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 27(1); MINN. STAT.
§ 631.21; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-201; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §
815; OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755; P.R. R. CRIM. P. 247(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-4; VT. R. CRIM. P.
48(b)(2); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 8.3)). See also People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 420 (N.Y. 1983)
(citations omitted) (“Although the current version of [the “interests of justice” statute] is, in
substantial part, the product of its recent amendment, the inherent power it bespeaks has ancient
roots. . . . [I]t had a respected place in the common law.”); State v. Knapstad, 706 P.2d 238, 240–41
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in light of the triviality of the offense.162 Notably, when dismissing charges “in the
interest of justice,” the court is substituting its judgment for that of the prosecutor,
without necessarily finding misconduct in the form of prosecutorial abuse,
arbitrariness or bad faith. In some states, courts may review other discretionary
decisions, such as prosecutors’ decisions regarding pretrial diversion, that plainly
call for weighing various policy considerations, not merely assessing the strength
of the evidence.163
State courts that engage in more substantial review of prosecutorial decision
making than their federal counterparts have been undeterred by state constitutional
principles of separation of powers. In general, state courts exercise a broader form
of judicial authority, both when they review prosecutors’ charging decisions164 and
when they review other discretionary decisions.165 To some degree, their practice
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (courts have authority “in the furtherance of justice” to dismiss any criminal
prosecution due to “arbitrary action or governmental misconduct,” as well as “the inherent authority .
. . to dismiss for insufficiency of the charge”). See generally Valena Elizabeth Beety, Judicial
Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629 (2015); Brown, supra note 136, at 1248
nn.79–81 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 7.67 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (1993); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 17-A, § 12 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11 (West 1995); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONST.
STAT. ANN. § 312 (West 1998). See generally Brent G. Filbert, Annotation, Defense of
Inconsequential or De Minimis Violation in Criminal Prosecution, 68 A.L.R. 5th 299 (1999).
163
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ayers, 525 A.2d 804 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (upholding PA. R.
CRIM. P. 179(c)). But see Commonwealth v. Cline, 800 A.2d 978 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). See also
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–15–105(b)(3); State v. Lavorgna, 437 A.2d 131, 137–38 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1981); State v. Dalgish, 432 A.2d 74 (N.J. 1981); State v. Webb, No. E2009-02507-CCA-R9-CD,
2011 WL 5332862, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2011) (citing cases).
164
See Brown, supra note 136. See also State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696, 698
(Wis. 1989) (overruling State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 401 N.W.2d 782 (Wis. 1987))
(upholding judicial authority to investigate criminal allegations and initiate criminal charges, and
overruling earlier decision, on the ground that “the premise of [the previous case]—that initiation of
criminal prosecution is an exclusively executive power in Wisconsin—is erroneous”); Frank J.
Remington & Wayne A. Logan, Frank Miller and the Decision to Prosecute, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 159
(1991); Wayne A. Logan, Comment, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of Wisconsin
Prosecutors, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1695.
165
See, e.g., People v. Ford, 331 N.W.2d 878, 898 (Mich. 1982) (Levin, J., dissenting) (calling
on court to reject prosecutorial practice of charging a defendant with a felony for conduct that could
have been charged as a misdemeanor, on the grounds that “[t]he separation of powers is not absolute”
and “[t]he manner in which [the prosecutor] exercises that legislatively delegated power is subject to
judicial review”); State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254–55 (Minn. 1996) (holding that judicial stay
of adjudication does not violate separation of powers and citing precedent for the proposition that the
trial “decision to stay adjudication of Krotzer’s charge instead of accepting his guilty plea fell within
the ‘inherent judicial power’ we have repeatedly recognized, and was necessary to the furtherance of
justice”); State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607 (N.J. 1977) (holding that separation of powers does not
preclude judicial review of prosecutors’ pretrial diversion decisions). See Brown, supra note 136, at
1248 n.81, 1251 n.96. But see People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564, 568 35 Cal. 4th 635, 642 (Cal. 2005)
(holding that statutory requirement “that the criminal court must secure the prosecutor’s consent
before it can order a Youth Authority commitment violates the state Constitution’s separation of
powers doctrine”); id. at 566–68 (citing cases).
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may reflect a different theoretical approach than that of the federal courts. By way
of comparison, criminal prosecutors’ discretionary decisions are reviewed by
courts in other countries. 166 Though, perhaps of limited direct relevance, 167
practices outside the United States may cast doubt on federal courts’ assumptions
about the detriment of such judicial review. More generally, as scholars have
noted, federal courts’ views regarding separation of powers in the criminal context
are far from unassailable,168 and state courts have been and remain entitled to see
things differently. In part, state courts’ more liberal approach to judicial authority
in criminal cases may simply reflect a different history.169

166
Some scholars have pointed to continental law models, such as the German system, in
which “[d]ecisions to prosecute or not prosecute are subject to review by a judge.” George C.
Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1043, 1057 (2005). See also Brown, supra note 136, at 1255 n.107 and accompanying text;
Yue Ma, A Comparative View of Judicial Supervision of Prosecutorial Discretion, 44 CRIM. L. BULL.
Jan.-Feb. 2008 (2008).
167
For expressions of skepticism, see, for example, Pizzi, supra note 26, at 1351–62. See also
Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2006); Erik Luna &
Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413 (2010).
168
Separation of powers questions are a source of perennial debate. In particular, some
scholars question the basis for federal courts’ reliance on separation of powers as a ground for a
highly deferential approach to prosecutors’ charging decisions. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow,
Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 993 (2006); Brown, supra note
136, passim; Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and
Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 13 (2009). See also Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial
Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 397 (1976); Kenneth Culp Davis,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 210 (1969); Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of
Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 204 (1990);
Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38
AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989). Cf. Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987) (“In
considering the separation of powers[,] . . . we start with the proposition that there is nothing inherent
in the prosecutorial function that would suggest insulating prosecutorial policies from judicial
review.”).
If anything, at least one scholar suggests the degree of authority exercised by federal
prosecutors contradicts constitutional principles of separation of powers. See Barkow, supra note 22,
at 871. Cf. Davis, supra note 13, at 453, 456.
169
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stivala, 645 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (noting that
although “[h]istorically, at common law, a prosecutor had the authority to enter a nolle prosequi on
his own motion. . . . [t]his unfettered power was modified by” Pennsylvania statutes in 1850 and
1860, “which required that before a nolle prosequi could be entered, the assent of the proper court
must be obtained”); State v. Conger, 797 N.W.2d 341, 366 (Wis. 2010) (Abrahamson, C.J.,
concurring) (“Even a brief review of the history of the relative powers of the district attorney and trial
court in criminal cases thus demonstrates the basic point that there are historically shared powers
between the executive and judicial branch relating to charging and amending or dismissing
charges.”); State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696, 698, 699 (Wis. 1989) (noting that the
“John Doe criminal proceeding has a long history in Wisconsin. . . . [and] has been used by courts,
pursuant to statute, since 1839” and that “the same procedure we review today was in use in 1848,
and was presumably considered constitutionally sound by the framers themselves”); id. at 700 (noting
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Perhaps more to the point, state courts have regularly exercised disciplinary
review of various aspects of prosecutors’ decision making. In the first half of the
twentieth century, state courts exercised regulatory and disciplinary authority in a
manner that required close judicial scrutiny of prosecutors’ charging decisions,
notwithstanding arguable concerns about confidentiality and separation of
powers.170 In particular, courts sanctioned prosecutors for failures to prosecute
when there was sufficient evidence upon which to file charges. In some instances,
prosecutors were disciplined for systematically refusing to bring certain charges,
typically involving gambling, prostitution or the illegal sale of alcohol. 171 In
others, prosecutors were punished for failing to prosecute specific individuals.172
It should be noted that these cases, arguably, do not illustrate an expansive
exercise of judicial disciplinary authority over prosecutors’ discretionary decisions.
that the statute has stood “substantially unchanged” for more than one hundred and fifty years, during
which time “judicial initiation of criminal prosecution[]has never appeared to be considered to be
inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers”); id. at 700 n.4, 700–01 (citing Samuel
Becker, Judicial Scrutiny of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Decision Not to File a Complaint, 71
MARQ. L. REV. 749 (1988)) (noting that “prior to 1945, the filing of a criminal complaint was not
only allowable as a judicial prerogative, it was probably exclusively a judicial responsibility”); id. at
700 (citing historical record “cast[ing] grave doubt” on the argument that under the 1969 statute, “the
charging power was, as a matter of constitutional law, exclusively within the province of the
executive”). See also Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New
Jersey, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1087 (2005) (analyzing New Jersey Attorney General’s issuance of
“Brimage Guidelines” for plea bargains, in response to New Jersey Supreme Court decisions). But
see State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting New Jersey’s approach to separation of
powers).
170
See infra note 174. See also Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317,
326 (Conn. 1995) (citations omitted) (“It is well established that the judicial branch has the inherent
power to investigate the conduct of an officer of the court. ‘The Superior Court possesses inherent
authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.’”); id. at 327 (“Like
all attorneys, prosecutors serve as officers of the court. Therefore, since the days of the Connecticut
colony, they have been subject to judicial control”); id. (“[T]race the history of prosecutorial power in
Connecticut to understand the extent to which the judiciary may permissibly interfere with that
power”); id. (“Unlike its federal counterpart, state prosecutorial power arose initially from the
common law. The principle of public prosecution for crimes against the sovereign originated in
colonial times. Prosecutors were appointed by and answerable to the sovereign because public justice
could not depend upon the financial resources of victims.”); id. (“Because prosecutors were viewed
as ministers of justice, their duties were . . . considered quasi-judicial and ‘not purely those of an
executive officer.’”); id. at 331 (finding “nothing in the history of the office of the state’s attorney
that has required the judicial branch to abdicate its inherent role in the supervision of the bar in favor
of the executive branch or that has vested the exclusive power to discipline a prosecutor in the
executive branch”); id. at 332 (“The judiciary is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the
court rules and must use its inherent power over the administration of justice to prevent action that
undermines the integrity of the system.”).
171
See, e.g., In re Graves, 146 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1941); In re Voss, 90 N.W. 15 (N.D. 1902);
In re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541 (N.D. 1900). See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 748 n.95. See generally
MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6; Note, District Court Discipline of State Prosecutor for Failure to
Enforce State Laws, 57 YALE L.J. 125 (1947).
172
Commonwealth ex rel. v. Stump, 57 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1933); In re Burton, 246 P. 188
(Utah 1926); In re Wakefield, 177 A. 319 (Vt. 1935).
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It appears that in the early twentieth century, prosecutors were expected to bring
charges in all cases supported by the evidence, without taking into account policy
considerations that might favor declining to prosecute. Accordingly, the
disciplinary inquiry in cases of failure to prosecute was presumably limited to a
determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to support prosecution,
without the need to second-guess a prosecutor’s discretionary judgment. The same
limitations would seem to apply in contemporary disciplinary proceedings brought
against prosecutors for filing charges that were unsupported by probable cause, 173
in violation of ethics rules based on Model Rule 3.8(a), or its predecessor. 174
Although this inquiry potentially requires disclosure of aspects of the prosecutor’s
investigation, a court’s principal task involves determining the strength of the
evidence, a task that courts regularly undertake in adjudication as well.
Other forms of disciplinary inquiry call into question the motivations for
prosecutors’ charging decisions, in a way that illustrates a more direct rejection of
the concerns underlying the federal case law. For example, prosecutors have been
held to be subject to discipline for accepting a bribe or gratuity in exchange for
declining to prosecute or dismissing charges,175 or for failure to prosecute a serious
crime as a result of the lawyer’s “grossly negligent” lack of preparation in the
case.176 Prosecutors have also been disciplined for making discretionary decisions

173

See In re Leonhardt, 930 P.2d 844 (Or. 1997) (imposing discipline on prosecutor for a
number of ethics violations, including knowingly filing charges that were not supported by probable
cause); In re Aubuchon, 309 P.3d 886 (Ariz. 2013); In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-20119002 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012); In re Bunston, 155 P. 1109 (Mont. 1916). In several other cases, the
disciplinary charges were not sustained. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548,
573–74 (Md. 2003); In re Burrows, 629 P.2d 820, 826 (Or. 1981); In re Lucareli, 611 N.W.2d 754
(Wis. 2000). Several other cases involved Iowa prosecutors who, with the knowledge and approval
of the trial judge, allowed defendants charged with more serious crimes (as to which there was
probable cause) to plead guilty to minor motor vehicle offenses that had no relationship to the
defendants’ alleged conduct. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205
(Iowa 2007); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176 (Iowa 2005); Iowa Sup.
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 2005). Interestingly, the practice
condemned by the Iowa Supreme Court in these decisions is openly undertaken in many other states.
See Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961 (2010).
174
These rules essentially codify the constitutional restriction on prosecuting a charge without
probable cause. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
175
See, e.g., In re Wilson, 258 P.2d 433 (Ariz. 1953); People v. Anglim, 78 P. 687 (Colo.
1904); In re Norris, 57 P. 528 (Kan. 1899); In re Bell, 72 So. 3d 825 (La. 2011); In re Jackson, 27 So.
3d 273 (La. 2010); In re Burks, 964 So. 2d 298 (La. 2007); In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179 (Minn.
1988); In re Biggers, 104 P. 1083 (Okla. 1909). Cf. Boyne v. Ryan, 34 P. 707, 708 (Cal. 1893) (“Of
course, if in a clear case he should willfully, corruptly, or inexcusably refuse to perform his duty in
the premises, he could be proceeded against for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office.”).
176
See In re Segal, 617 A.2d 238, 244 (N.J. 1992) (quoting RPC 1.1(a), RPC 1.3) (imposing
discipline for prosecutor’s failure to prepare adequately to prosecute a case, in violation of ethics
rules providing in part that “[a] lawyer shall not: (a) Handle or neglect a matter entrusted to the
lawyer in such manner that the lawyer’s conduct constitutes gross negligence” and “[a] lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”).
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in instances where they had conflicts of interests, based on a professional, familial
or business relationship with the putative defendant, or where their own financial
interests were at stake.177 Although the applicable disciplinary standard in these
cases does not require a court to substitute its policy judgment for that of the
prosecutor, it does require a greater intrusion into confidentiality and greater
entanglement in the decision-making process than a mere review of the sufficiency
of the evidence against the accused.
Whatever the theoretical justification, in practice, numerous state courts have
exercised the authority to discipline prosecutors, expressing little doubt over their
authority to do so. In late nineteenth century and early twentieth century
disciplinary cases against prosecutors, state courts repeatedly emphasized judicial
authority and responsibility to impose discipline as a response to prosecutorial
misconduct, including in the context of charging decisions.178 Contemporary state
courts have continued to reject prosecutors’ separation of powers arguments,
implicitly or explicitly.179

177

See, e.g., In re Bevins, 26 Haw. 570 (Haw. 1922); In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179 (Minn.
1988). See also MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6 (citing cases); Zacharias, supra note 6, at 723–34
nn.6–7 (citing cases).
178
See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Pelletier, 134 N.E. 407 (Mass. 1922) (rejecting separation of powers
argument in upholding judicial authority, pursuant to a statute, to remove a prosecutor from office for
commission of a number of ethical violations, including failure to prosecute); In re Simpson, 83 N.W.
541, 553 (N.D. 1900) (imposing discipline for failure to prosecute, finding that “[t]he power to
discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of
record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions”); In re Burton, 246 P.
188 (Utah 1926) (citing both statutory authority and court’s “inherent power . . . to cancel and revoke
[prosecutor’s] license and bar him from thereafter engaging in the practice of the law” for ethical
violations including failure to prosecute, “though he, at the time, may hold a judicial or other official
position”); In re Jones, 39 A. 1087, 1090–91 (Vt. 1898) (finding that prosecutor was “acting in his
official capacity as an attorney of this court, and under the obligations assumed by him when he
became such attorney” and that therefore “it is, beyond question, the right and duty of this court to
deal with him as justice demands” and “[i]t may suspend or disbar him” for failure to prosecute);
State v. Hays, 61 S.E. 355, 356 (W. Va. 1908) (finding that “[t]he mere fact that [the prosecutor] is
liable to indictment for malfeasance in office, and to removal therefrom, does in no way affect the
power and duty of the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys for the same misconduct for
which he could be also both indicted and removed”).
179
See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317 (Conn. 1995)
(holding, on the basis of both historical and normative principles, that separation of powers did not
preclude judicial regulation and sanction of a prosecutor for misconduct committed in the course of
the exercise of prosecutorial functions, including prosecuting a case without probable cause to
believe defendant was guilty); cf. In re Appointment of Special State’s Att’y, 713 N.E. 2d 168, 177
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (upholding judicial authority to terminate special State Attorney’s appointment
pursuant to statute, on the grounds that the attorney was “unable to attend” to duties, and holding that
judge’s order “was consistent with the judicial branch’s role of supervising those attorneys who
practice before it” and that “[t]he court’s overall supervision of a specially appointed State’s Attorney
is not a judicial usurpation of executive discretion and does not constitute a violation of separation of
powers”). See generally Melissa K. Atwood, Comment, Who Has the Last Word?: An Examination
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The 1976 Oregon decision, In re Rook, 180 provides a particularly helpful
illustration of a court’s willingness to employ disciplinary authority to rein in
abuses of prosecutorial discretion. After making a plea offer to one defendant,
Rook refused to offer a similar deal to fifteen similarly situated defendants because
they were represented by either of two attorneys whom Rook mistrusted.
Significantly, plea bargain policies—particularly decisions to refuse to offer a plea
bargain to a defendant—are often cited by courts as an area of prosecutorial
discretion outside of the purview of adjudicatory review.181 Here, however, the
court disciplined the prosecutor for engaging in conduct “prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” 182 The court reasoned that the prosecutor violated a
state statute requiring that “[s]imilarly situated defendants should be afforded equal
plea agreement opportunities,”183 and that the prosecutor’s plea bargain policy was
motivated by “overzealousness,” “frustration,” “animosity and a desire to
punish.”184 The court observed that “to our knowledge, this is the first reported
decision not only in Oregon, but in any other jurisdiction in the United States,
involving a charge of misconduct against a prosecuting attorney in refusing to plea
bargain with a criminal defendant.”185
While it seems unlikely that federal courts would undertake such inquiry into
a prosecutor’s motivations, state courts have been less restrained, adopting a more
liberal view of judicial power.186 Moreover, regardless of any separation of power
concerns, Rook demonstrates the authority and ability of a state court to inquire
after-the-fact and sanction the prosecutor, if necessary, for an abuse of discretion,
particularly for a violation of a statutory standard.
In sum, it is far from clear that federal separation of powers limitations on
federal judges’ oversight of prosecutors’ discretion should be applicable to state
court disciplinary regulation. State courts exercise the inherent authority to
regulate the practice of law in their own jurisdiction, through which they enact and
implement ethics rules that potentially subject lawyers to discipline.
Notwithstanding concerns about separation of powers and the deference owed to
prosecutorial discretionary decisions, state court opinions often demonstrate an
of the Authority of State Bar Grievance Committees to Investigate and Discipline Prosecutors for
Breaches of Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 201 (1998).
180
In re Rook, 556 P.2d 1351 (Or. 1976).
181
See generally Brown, supra note 136.
182
In re Rook, 556 P.2d at 1355 (citing DR 1-102(A)(5)).
183
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.405(4).
184
In re Rook, 556 P.2d at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185
Id. at 1357.
186
See Boulas v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (ordering dismissal
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overriding concern for judicial authority and responsibility to review and respond
to prosecutorial misconduct. Contrary to the assumptions of several scholars, state
courts have rejected separation of powers arguments in favor of judicial
responsibility to ensure the fair administration of justice through the exercise of
their authority to review charging decisions. Moreover, the relative infrequency of
state court disciplinary review of prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining
decisions may not reflect a view that the state constitution forbids courts from
intruding into prosecutors’ exercise of discretion. Alternatively, disciplinary
authorities may have a general reluctance to proceed against prosecutors, in part
because prosecutors’ motivations and processes for making charging and plea
bargaining decisions are rarely visible; indeed, in the case of declinations, even the
fact that a decision was made may not always be visible outside the prosecutor’s
office.
B. State Court Adoption or Interpretation of Disciplinary Rules to Regulate
Prosecutors’ Charging Decisions
In Section A, we showed that state courts’ disciplinary authority allows a
measure of inquiry into prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining practices.
Among other points, we noted, it would be reasonable for state courts to discipline
prosecutors who abuse their discretion in violation of constitutional or statutory
standards. The more difficult question, however, is the extent of state courts’
rulemaking authority to establish independent disciplinary standards that govern
prosecutors’ exercise of charging and plea bargaining discretion, and the degree to
which that power is limited by state constitutional separation of powers
principles.187
In Rook, for example, the court relied on the prosecutor’s violation of a
statutory standard as the ground for imposing discipline for the prosecutor’s abuse
of charging discretion. Absent the statutory violation, might the court have
punished the prosecutor for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice?
Doing so would imply independent judicial authority to adopt an ethics rule that
has the effect of forbidding a prosecutor from making arbitrary or improperly
motivated charging or plea bargaining decisions. Such lawmaking authority might
derive from courts’ inherent or supervisory power to regulate lawyers,188 or from
the power that some state courts have exercised to remove prosecutors who are not
faithfully carrying out the duties of the office.189
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Early disciplinary decisions sanctioning prosecutors for failure to prosecute
do not resolve this question,190 because they were premised on the prosecutor’s
statutory obligation to bring all cases supported by sufficient evidence.191 Today,
in contrast, prosecutors are generally expected to balance a variety of legitimate
considerations in deciding whether to prosecute in individual cases or classes of
cases in which there is sufficient evidence of guilt to go forward.192 Thus, like
Rook, the early cases support the authority of state courts to sanction prosecutors
for charging decisions that violate statutory law, but they leave open the question
of state courts’ authority to establish their own disciplinary standards governing
prosecutors’ charging discretion.193
Nor is this question resolved by cases in which courts have disciplined
prosecutors for making discretionary decisions in instances where they had
conflicts of interests.194 In these cases, rather than reviewing the substance of the
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion, the courts imposed discipline on the grounds
that prosecutors with conflicts of interests should not participate in the matter at
all. Therefore, the conflict cases do not resolve whether courts have the authority,
absent a settled legal standard, to sanction prosecutors for abusing their discretion.
However, a handful of other contemporary decisions suggest some
willingness among state courts to look beyond established law and to invoke their
own disciplinary standards to regulate prosecutors’ discretionary charging and plea
bargaining decisions. For example, a New Jersey prosecutor was sanctioned for
fixing traffic tickets as a favor for someone with connections to the police and
political figures.195 Notably, unlike other cases where prosecutors were punished
for fixing tickets, 196 the prosecutor did not act criminally or to serve his own
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financial self-interest, nor did the prosecutor have a personal connection to the
defendant such that participating in the matter involved a conflict of interest. 197
Nevertheless, it was plain to the court that the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion
was punishable in that it was based on an impermissible consideration: The
prosecutor favored individuals in the criminal process because of their
connections. Likewise, as the more recent disciplinary case against Andrew
Thomas illustrates, 198 courts may consider themselves authorized to discipline
prosecutors for factoring impermissible considerations—such as political
animosity—into their charging decisions.
The most far-reaching and illuminating decision on courts’ disciplinary
authority to set independent standards regulating prosecutorial discretion may be a
2012 case, In re Flatt-Moore,199 in which an Indiana prosecutor was reprimanded
for conditioning a favorable plea bargain on the defendant’s willingness to meet
the victim’s demand for restitution in an amount exceeding the victim’s actual loss.
The court stated that although prosecutors have discretion to consider the victim’s
input, they may not put the terms of plea bargains “entirely in the hands of the
victims,” because then “defendants whose victims are unreasonable or vindictive
cannot receive the same consideration as defendants whose victims are reasonable
in their demands. . . . [R]esolution of criminal charges could [appear to] turn on
the whims of victims rather than the equities of each case.”200 While in Thomas,
abuses of prosecutorial discretion were overshadowed by other forms of
prosecutorial misconduct, 201 in Flatt-Moore, the improper use of the charging
power was the sole ground for discipline.
The Flatt-Moore decision is thus a potentially strong, albeit implicit,
vindication of judicial power to set disciplinary standards for prosecutorial abuse
of charging discretion. Significantly, unlike disciplinary cases involving bribery or
prosecutorial violations of constitutional or legislative standards, the restriction the
Flatt-Moore court imposed on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was both
judicially constructed and, even if justified, far from obvious and at least subject to
debate. After all, the court’s conclusion that similar cases should not be treated
differently based on the different preferences of victims is not self-evident.
Indeed, prosecutors are ordinarily permitted or expected to take account of victims’
Jackson, 27 So. 3d 273 (La. 2010); In re Burks, 964 So. 2d 298 (La. 2007); In re Serstock, 432
N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 1988); In re Rosen, 452 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
197
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In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012). See supra notes
101–06 and accompanying text.
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200
Id. at 245. See also In re Bonet, 29 P.3d 1242 (Wash. 2001) (imposing discipline for
prosecutor’s offer to dismiss charges against defendant in exchange for defendant’s agreement not to
testify on behalf of co-defendant).
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interests, and in some jurisdictions they are required by law to do so. 202 For
example, it is at least plausible that in deciding whether to seek the death penalty in
a capital case, a prosecutor may defer to the preferences of a victim’s family, 203 or
that in deciding whether to offer a favorable plea in a domestic violence case, a
prosecutor may defer to the victim’s preference whether or not to testify at trial.
Although the court in Flatt-Moore found that the prosecutor overvalued the
victim’s interests, the prosecutor’s decision making was apparently based on a
broad evaluation of legitimate considerations, not on an impermissible or irrelevant
relationship with the victim.
Nevertheless, the court criticized the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion on the
ground that the victim’s desire for greater compensation seemed “unreasonable” or
“vindictive.” 204 Apparently, from the court’s perspective, the prosecutor
essentially enabled a private party to take the prosecutorial reins for the purposes
of extorting excessive civil restitution. Arguably, however, from the prosecutor’s
perspective, it may have seemed appropriate for victims of financial crimes to be
compensated in a greater amount than their actual loss, taking into account the
costs, including money, time, and anxiety, attributable to pursuing restitution. In
rejecting this approach, the court appears to have exercised the authority to
substitute its judgment about prosecutorial priorities for those of the prosecutor,
thus reaching a decision that may have broad implications for questions regarding
the extent and limits of judicial authority to establish and enforce disciplinary
standards for prosecutor’s charging decisions.
Finally, it should be noted that expanded judicial exercise of disciplinary
authority to regulate prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining decisions would
not be limited to reviewing and potentially meting out punishment in response to
accusations of prosecutorial misconduct. State courts could also set standards
regulating prosecutorial discretion, either by adopting additional rules of
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professional conduct explicitly addressing prosecutors’ discretionary decision
making,205 or by issuing interpretive opinions applying existing ethics rules in the
context of charging and plea bargaining. 206 For example, courts might forbid
practices that, though lawful, seem ethically problematic, such as pursuing
criminal charges unless an arrestee waives colorable civil rights claims, 207 or
making “exploding” plea offers that are withdrawn before defense counsel can
adequately investigate the case and competently advise the defendant.208 However,
whether and how courts should exercise robust disciplinary authority are questions
that will remain for another day.209
V. CONCLUSION
Our examination of state court review of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions,
in the context of both adjudication and discipline, does not justify, with any degree
of confidence, predictions about the future expansion of disciplinary authority over
prosecutors’ charging decisions. Recent cases, such as Thomas and Flatt-Moore,
in which courts disciplined prosecutors for abusing their discretion, might be
viewed as aberrations or, alternatively, as modest and tentative steps with
important potential implications for a more expansive exercise of courts’
regulatory authority.
Nevertheless, the extensive historical and contemporary record of judicial
review of prosecutors’ charging decisions may indeed suggest a justification for
state courts, if they so choose, to regulate prosecutorial discretion more
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meaningfully. Likewise, law reform advocates seeking avenues to respond to
documented and perceived incidents of prosecutorial abuse of discretion may be
encouraged to give a fresh look to the possible role of state court disciplinary
regulation. Ultimately, it would appear that the extent to which state courts might
be expected to exercise a more robust form of disciplinary authority over
prosecutorial charging decisions will turn on courts’ broader understanding of
judicial responsibility to ensure the fair administration of justice within the
confines of their interpretation of the limitations that state constitutions impose on
judicial power.

